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Non-Technical Summary
The national systems of financial supervision in Europe are experiencing major
reforms. Apart from the debate on specialised versus integrated supervision there are
two “hot” issues: First, there is a controversy whether the national approach in
European supervision is still justified or whether a European system of financial
supervisors should be established. Second, there is no agreement about the role of
central banks in future supervisory structures.
It is not the intention of this analysis to reiterate or elaborate the welfare arguments
that are being used in the discussion. Instead, we try to shed more light on a
neglected but important aspect: the interests of major players in supervisory reform.
Since Stigler (1971) it has become well established that regulation is not solely
driven by the legislators’ desire to maximise the general welfare. Regulation can
also be used for the benefit of influential interest groups since it offers scope for
intransparent off-budget redistribution. It is the objective of this analysis to test for
the relevance of Stigler’s view on regulation in the context of banking supervision.
Based on a cross-section data set we test several hypotheses deduced from this
private interest theory. Beforehand we assess the relevance of the public interest
view that accounts for welfare enhancing regulation. The empirical results lend
support to the relevance of the private interest view: The difference of supervisory
systems in terms of stringency indicators has no significant impact on the likelihood
of a systemic banking crisis. This leaves per se a larger scope for the private interest
view following Stigler’s capture theory.
In this context we differentiate between the “barriers to entry” and the “preference
for laxity” hypothesis. According to the barriers to entry hypothesis one would
expect banks to press for higher supervisory standards in order to reduce
competition. In contrast, the preference for laxity hypothesis states that banks are
interested in lax and low-cost supervisory standards since they regard supervision as
a cost burden. Our empirical results concerning the barriers to entry hypothesis are
not clear cut. We find some evidence that tougher supervision is associated with
higher bank margins, i.e. lower competition. However, higher supervisory standards
do not significantly effect concentration in the banking market. This finding allows
to concentrate on the preference for laxity hypothesis which is clearly supported:
The regulated banking industry exerts influence on supervisory standards in the
sense that they press for lax and low-cost supervisory standards.
Finally, there is a clear message for the ongoing reform process in European banking
supervision. Everybody who wants to forecast the outcome of this process has to
identify the industry’s interests. These interests can be expected to have a major
impact for the future system.
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Abstract
The system of banking supervision in Europe is undergoing substantial reforms.
According to Stigler’s capture theory regulation often follows the preferences of
producers. Therefore, the interests of the financial industry might be a major driving
force for the ongoing supervisory reform debate. This paper identifies possible
interests of the regulated industries: Either they might favour strict supervision to
create barriers for entry and thus to reduce competitive pressure in their market. Or
they might use their political influence to press for a lax and low-cost supervisory
system. A cross-country data base on supervisory systems and financial structure
allows the application of a three-step testing procedure. It turns out that the private
interest view on regulation is indeed relevant and that the data is more compatible
with a “preference for laxity” than with a “barriers to entry” view.
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11 Introduction
The national systems of financial supervision in Europe are experiencing major
reforms. Structures that had been kept unchanged for decades are now
undergoing substantial adjustments. Recent examples are the UK, Germany and
Austria where integrated supervisory agencies have been installed replacing
different former specialised agencies with their separate responsibilities for
banking, insurance and securities. The ongoing reform debate goes even further.
Apart from the debate on specialised versus integrated supervision there are two
“hot” issues: First, there is a controversy whether the national approach in
European supervision is still justified or whether a European system of financial
supervisors should be established. Second, there is no agreement about the role
of central banks in future supervisory structures.
It is not the intention of this analysis to reiterate or elaborate the welfare
arguments that are being used in the discussion from a public interest
perspective.1 Instead, we try to shed more light on a neglected but important
aspect: the interests of major players in supervisory reform. Since Stigler (1971)
it has become well established that regulation is not solely driven by the
legislators’ desire to maximise the general welfare. Regulation can also be used
for the benefit of influential interest groups since it offers scope for intransparent
off-budget redistribution. It is the objective of this analysis to test for the
relevance of Stigler’s view on regulation in the context of banking supervision.
The empirical basis is a cross-sectional data base on national supervisory
systems and structural data.
Even a superficial glance at the ongoing European debate reveals that the
personal interests of important actors play a role. The clearest example is given
by prominent European central bankers arguing regularly in favour of an
important role of central banks in the new supervisory structures. This paper’s
focus, however, will not be on the interests of regulating bureaucrats but – in
line with the Stigler view – on the interests of the regulated industry.
Furthermore, the analysis will not deal with financial market supervision in
general but with banking supervision in particular. This concentration will allow
for precision regarding the regulated industry’s preferences.
Our political-economic view on banking supervision aims at an improved
understanding of important driving forces in the supervisory system’s reform
                                          
1 For a discussion on the involvement of the central bank in banking supervision see, e.g.,
Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1993), Goodhart and Schonemaker (1995), Haubrich (1996),
Peek et al. (1999), Goodhart (2000) and Barth et al. (2001b). For arguments concerning a
single European banking supervisory structure see, e.g., Lannoo (2000) and Speyer (2001).
2process. This better understanding might be helpful in forecasting the likely
evolution of the system.
Our empirical results based on a large country cross-section strongly support the
idea that the banking industry’s interests are among the relevant factors driving
the system’s evolution. 
The analysis proceeds in the following way: After a short survey of the relevant
literature (section 2), we show the link between supervisory regulation and the
interests of the banking industry (section 3). This analysis results in the
formulation of hypotheses that are open for consecutive testing. In section 4 we
describe the cross country database on supervisory systems and financial
structure that we collected. Section 5 presents the empirical model and our
estimation results. Section 6 puts forward some conclusions with a special focus
on the European supervisory reform debate.
2 Banking applications of Stigler’s capture theory
According to Stigler’s capture view on regulation (Stigler, 1971), the interests of
producers tend to be more influential in shaping regulatory legislation than
consumers’ interests. Consumers suffer from the high costs of organising their
interest, the wide dispersion of costs and the information problem.
Understanding the distributional consequences of regulation is much harder than
in the case of cash redistribution. From the point of view of elected legislators
this information problem on the side of consumers/voters decreases the political
costs of favouring producers in terms of expected vote losses. This allows
politicians to adjust regulation according to the preferences of the industry. In
contrast to consumers, the regulated industry is often well-organised and faces
powerful incentives to overcome information problems and to influence
legislation e.g. through campaign financing, vote support or provision of biased
information.
In spite of this asymmetry of influence between producers and consumers the
impact of consumer interests on the regulatory outcome cannot be expected to
be zero. Peltzman (1976) stresses the fact that, usually, a regulation fully in line
with the solution preferred by producers will not be the political equilibrium. In
price regulation, the usual vote maximising regulated prices lie somewhere
below the monopoly price. In the Peltzman model regulating politicians apply a
simple marginal calculus: They choose the structure and intensity of regulation
in order to equalise the marginal vote losses of burdening consumers with the
marginal vote gains from benefiting producers. In his contribution to the positive
theory of regulation, Becker (1983) emphasises the importance of the
deadweight loss which is defined as the difference between the winner’s benefit
minus the loser’s cost resulting from regulation. With growing deadweight
3losses politicians face increasing resistance from the losers, thus making the
winning interest group less powerful. 
To our knowledge, this view on regulation has so far not been applied to
banking supervision. However, there is a closely related literature on the
political economy of banking market entry regulation with empirical
applications to the U.S. The guiding question of this strand of literature is
whether the private interest view on regulation helps to understand the
liberalisation steps that had been taken in the U.S. since the seventies.
Kroszner and Strahan (1999) focus on state-level deregulation of branching
restrictions in the U.S. banking market. Prior to the 1970s, in many U.S. states
there existed legislation restricting within-state branching and all states forbade
interstate branching. The deregulation started in 1975 and was accomplished in
the 1990s. Based on a hazard model, the authors show that interest related
factors such as the relative strength of deregulation’s winners and losers can
help to explain the timing of deregulation in different states. Furthermore, these
factors turn out to be significant in explaining voting behaviour in Congress
votes on key deregulation acts. Kane (1996) looks at the same deregulation
experience from a theoretical point of view. According to his approach the
abolition of market entry restrictions can be explained by vanishing voters’
perception of the social purpose of regulation. Furthermore, restrictions come
under pressure when new technologies allow circumventing activities eroding
the protective value of regulation from the industry’s point of view.
Kroszner and Strahan (2000) execute a voting analysis on a 1991 Congress act
modernising the U.S. deposit insurance system. The authors conclude that
rivalry of interest within the industry (big versus small banks) and between
industries (banks versus insurance) as well as legislators’ ideology play a role:
There is a significant link between a constituency’s financial structure and the
voting behaviour of its parliamentary representative. Ramirez (2002) applies a
voting analysis to a 1998 legislation dismantling regulatory barriers between
commercial banks, investment banks and insurance companies existing since the
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. Ramirez focuses on the relevance of Political Action
Committee contributions from the financial industry and finds a significant
impact in line with the industry’s interests. This study thus supports the Stigler
hypothesis: Legislators react to favours they get from the regulated industry.
A somewhat related recent work is Barth et al. (2002a): Based on a large
country cross-section sample the authors test among other hypotheses for the
impact of supervision on banking efficiency. They mention the possibility that
supervisory regulation might not only be driven by the desire to improve
systemic stability but also by the self-interest of regulating politicians and
bureaucrats who create inefficient regulation in order to benefit favoured
4constituents, attract campaign donations or extract bribes. This view points to
the direction of our approach but relates the self-interest view only to the
regulators and bureaucrats and not to the regulated interest group itself. Thus, an
analysis does not yet exist that tests explicitly for a capture view on supervision.
3 The banking industry’s stakes in supervision and a three
stage testing procedure
Supervisory regulation offers an ideal precondition for capture: Its highly
technical and complex nature makes the information problem on the side of
consumers very relevant. In contrast to simple price regulation or even
compared to market entry regulation it is much more difficult for consumers to
understand which cost burden is associated with this type of regulation. At the
same time the incentives for the regulated industry to influence regulation are
substantial: Supervisory rules do not only influence administrative costs in
financial enterprises, they are also relevant for a market’s competition since they
influence the costs of market entry.
In order to derive testable hypotheses on the impact of the industry’s interest on
supervisory regulation according to the capture theory we now have to become
more explicit on the costs and benefits being associated with supervision.
Testable hypotheses are formulated in terms of a static cross-country
comparison since this corresponds to the available database.
Creating barriers to entry
Tight supervisory rules could possibly function as barriers to market entry. If the
national supervisory system is particularly tough by international standards this
could deter foreign institutes to enter the market. The high standards would
force entrants to invest considerable effort to adjust to the specific supervisory
requirements of the new market. If this is the case the domestic industry’s
interests can be identified in analogy to the arguments used in the literature on
market entry regulation in the U.S.: Incumbent banks in fear of foreign
competition can be expected to use their influence on national legislators to
develop national supervision as a barrier to entry.
Preference for laxity
The domestic industry’s preferences could, however, also be quite different from
the “barriers to entry” hypothesis. If supervision is not effective as a protective
tool, domestic banks would regard supervision first of all as a cost burden. Of
course, financial companies have a non-altruistic and existential interest in
financial stability. Even without any supervisory rules they would have an
incentive to limit risk exposure in line with the risk preferences of the managers
5or shareholders. However, legislated supervisory rules are based on the view
that the banks’ intrinsic and voluntary risk limiting is insufficient since
individual banks do not take into account systemic externalities of bank failures.
Therefore, the legislated supervisory rules normally impose binding restrictions
on banks since otherwise the legislation would be redundant. With this
background it can be expected that banks use their influence to alleviate the
restrictions and to reduce costs imposed by supervisory rules.
Any empirical approach to test for the relevance of the private interest’s view
faces two problems. First, the private interest view of banking regulation has
resulted in the hypotheses “barriers to entry” and “preference for laxity”. These
hypotheses imply opposite signs for the banking industry’s potential impact on
supervision. If the barriers to entry aspect is more relevant one would expect that
the industry should press for tough supervisory standards while with a
preference for laxity the opposite pressure should be expected.2
Second, we cannot a priori exclude the possibility that the public interest view is
not relevant for the understanding of banking supervision. In contrast to the
private interest view, the public interest view accounts for welfare-enhancing
regulation. From this perspective regulation occurs primarily to correct market
failures and protect poorly informed consumers from harm (Kroszner, 2000).
Regulation and supervision aims mainly at the reduction of systemic risk and the
safeguarding of the safety and soundness of the financial system. It might be the
case that the public interest in a stable banking system is so dominant that it is
driving the evolution of each single detail of the regulative system. This
becomes particularly obvious in regard to preference for laxity. Optimising
politicians are only willing to serve the preferences of suppliers as long as the
political costs associated with the burden on consumers do not outweigh the
producers advantages. This would be the case with a significant increase in the
systemic risk even though the systemic risk as such is not visible for voters and
consumers. An actual banking crisis would, however, be highly visible. An
increasing systemic risk means that the probability of such a highly visible event
would increase. For a politician maximising expected votes, this would be
perceived as relevant in his optimising regulatory activity. As a consequence,
with a very close link between supervisory effort and stability there would be no
scope for Stigler-type activities.
                                          
2 Note that in a dynamic context the barriers to entry hypothesis does not necessarily
contradict the preference for laxity hypothesis: In a first step, banks may press for tough
supervisory standards to restrict competition and after competition is reduced they may
press for lax supervisory standards. Since we hold a static view throughout the analysis,
banks may either press for tougher or laxer supervisory standards.
6We apply consecutive testing of three hypotheses to cope with these two
problems. In a first step we try to test whether there is leeway for the private
interest view on banking supervision. According to our arguments, there is a
strong case for the (not necessarily exclusive) relevance of banking sector
interests in supervision if no clear link between stability of the banking sector
and central parameters of the supervisory system can be established. If this link
is missing, there is scope for regulators to serve the regulated industry’s interests
without incurring major risks from system instability. Therefore, in a first step
we have to test the following hypothesis.
H1: There is a significant link between the characteristics of the supervisory
system and banking stability.
If this hypothesis is rejected at least for some parameters of the supervisory
system there is room for political-economic maneuvers in Stigler’s sense.
The next step aims at distinguishing between the two private interest view
hypotheses barriers to entry and preference for laxity. The barriers to entry
aspect can only be relevant if the supervisory system is indeed relevant for
competition. The weaker the evidence for a link between supervisory standards
and the market’s competition, the larger is the case for the relevance of the
preference for laxity within the private interest view. This leads to the
formulation of the second hypothesis.
H2: The competition in financial services markets depends on the stringency of
supervision. A high degree of supervisory stringency reduces competition.
The less support exists for this hypothesis, the more we can concentrate on the
preference for laxity hypothesis which can be formulated in the following way: 
H3: Countries with a relatively influential banking sector are, ceteris paribus,
countries with relatively low supervisory standards and costs.
Figure 1 summarises the logic of the three-step testing procedure. Before we
apply this testing design to our country cross-section sample we first describe
the database and explain the choice of our proxies.
- insert figure 1 about here -
4 Variable definition and data sources
We construct several variables that serve as proxies for the strength of prudential
rules and variables that represent the strength of the respective interest groups.
7In addition, we construct several variables to control for other explanatory
factors.
Most of the data is drawn from surveys conducted by the World Bank and the
U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). The World Bank
database on bank regulation and supervision contains data for 107 countries for
the year 1999.3 These 107 countries build the basis for the data set used in this
paper.4 The OCC survey focused on data for banking market structure and
performance. Although the OCC survey gathered annual information from 110
countries for the years 1996-1999 we used only data referring to 1999. From
these 110 countries we included only those that are also in the World Bank
database.5 Unless otherwise noted all variables refer to the year 1999.
Strength of supervisory regulation
Our main proxy for the strength of supervisory regulation is the total budget for
supervision in Mill. USD (BUDGET) either normalised by or used in
combination with an adequate control variable for the absolute size of a
country’s banking sector. Furthermore, the variable EXAM is number of onsite
examinations per bank in the last 5 years. In addition, we include the variables
SUPERVISORS that is the number of professional bank supervisors per
institution and official supervisory power (POWER). POWER is an index
constructed by Barth et al. (2001a) based upon yes and no responses to 16
questions from the World Bank survey indicating whether the supervisory
authorities have the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct
problems.6 POWER ranges from 0 to 16 with a higher value indicating more
power. Data for the variables BUDGET, EXAM and SUPERVISORS is drawn
from the World Bank database on bank regulation and supervision.
Banking industry variables
We include the following variable to serve as a proxy for the strength of the
banking industry: CLAIMSGDP is bank claims on private sector to GDP
calculated as the mean over the years 1990 to 1999. Bank claims on private
sector give an indication of the dependency of the real economy on the banking
industry. Therefore they represent the strength of the banking sector and its
                                          
3 For a detailed description of this data set see Barth et al. (2001a).
4 For a list of countries included see table A1 in the appendix.
5 Unfortunately, there are 25 countries that are not included in the OCC survey but are in our
base data set drawn from the World Bank data set.
6 For a list of these questions and a detailed description of the official supervisory power
index see Barth et al. (2001a: 18).
8political influence. It is useful to take the mean over several years instead of just
1999 data to correct for potential outlier and because the process of adjusting
supervisory regulation according to the preferences of the industry takes time.
Bank claims are taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (line
22d) and GDP from World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2001.
ASSETS, DEPOSITS and LOANS is total bank assets, deposits and loans in
Mill. USD, respectively. All these variables are obtained from the OCC survey.
In addition, we include the number of banks (BANKS) that is obtained from the
OCC survey.
Banking competition variables
We include several variables as a measure for competition and concentration in
the banking sector. These are important as endogenous variables in the context
of testing H2 and as a proxy for the ability of the banking industry to organise
their interests and to succeed in the political process. According to Becker
(1983) one would expect higher concentrated industries to be politically more
successful.
A standard competition indicator for the banking market is the interest rate
margin banks earn. The corresponding variable is DRATES calculated as lending
rate minus deposit rate in 1999 taken from the IMF’s Financial Statistics (lines
60l and 60p).
CONC1 and CONC2 is the percent of total assets and total deposits, respectively,
accounted for by the three largest banks in 1999. Both measures of
concentration are taken from the OCC survey.
In addition, we include among the competition related variables the percent of
banks (FOREIGN1) and bank assets (FOREIGN2), respectively, that are foreign
owned. These variables are obtained from the OCC survey.
Interindustry rivalry
Not just the banking industry itself has an incentive to influence supervisory
regulation but also the rivalry industries, i.e. the insurance industry. If banks are
also allowed to sell insurance products, insurance companies may have an
interest in relative high banking supervisory standards to weaken their potential
competitors. However, insurance preferences could also be contrary if insurers
regard distribution of own products over the bank counter as a helpful and
complementary distribution channel. In this case, one would expect the
9insurance industry to press for lax supervisory standards in banking. Thus, the
expected sign of the rival industry power is ambiguous.
To capture the effects of the rival insurance industry, we first constructed a
dummy variable that indicates whether banks are allowed to undertake insurance
activities. INSUR takes the value 1 if the insurance activity of banks is
unrestricted or permitted, and 0 if it is restricted or prohibited. This information
is obtained from responses to the World Bank survey.
In addition, we include the variables INSPEN and INSDEN, that is life
insurance penetration (premiums/GDP) and density (premiums/population),
respectively, as a proxy for the relative strength of the insurance industry. Both
variables are taken form the Swiss-Re Sigma database and calculated as the
mean over the years 1990 to 1999.
Public ownership 
Legislators will be the more willing to follow the industry’s interests the more
stakes a government has in the market. Managers of public banks should
therefore be particularly influential in shaping the supervisory system according
to the industry’s wishes. To test for this presumption we include GOVERN1 and
GOVERN2, that is the percent of banks and bank assets, respectively, that are
government owned. These variables are obtained from the OCC survey.
Banking system safety and soundness variables
We include two variables into our database that capture the safety and soundness
of the banking system. CLOSED is the number of banks closed in the last 5 years
taken from the World Bank database on the regulation and supervision of banks.
CRISIS is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country experienced a
systemic banking crisis and 0 otherwise. CRISIS is constructed on the basis of
Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) and complemented by information from Demirgüc
and Detragiache (2000) and Barth et al. (2001c). We use the Caprio and
Klingebiel definition of a systemic banking crisis meaning all or most of the
bank capital was exhausted during the period of the crisis. Their assessments are
made for the period late 1970s to early 1999.
Macroeconomic variables
We include the following macroeconomic control variables: GDP is current GDP
in million USD. POP is population in million. GDPCAPITA is GDP per capita in
constant 1995 USD and GDPGROWTH is annual GDP growth in percent.
GDPCAPITA and GDPGROWTH are calculated as the mean over the years 1990
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to 1999. All these variables are taken from the World Development Indicators
database.
Supervision structure variables
As additional control variables we include two variables capturing the structure
of the supervisory framework. MULTIPLE takes a value of 1 if there is more
than one bank supervisory authority and 0 if there is a single bank supervisor.
CB takes a value of 1 if the central bank is a bank supervisor and 0 if not. Both
variables are obtained from Barth et al. (2002b).
Other variables
In addition, we include MONITOR, a private monitoring index, constructed by
Barth et al. (2001a) that tries to capture to some degree the extent to which
market or private “supervision” exists in different countries.7 MONITOR is based
on responses to questions from the World Bank survey and ranges from 0 to 7
with higher values indicating more private oversight.
DI is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if there exists an explicit deposit
insurance scheme in the country and 0 if there is just an implicit deposit
insurance. This variable is taken from the World Bank database on deposit
insurance.8
Finally we include two regional dummy variables OECD and EU taking the value
1 if the country is an OECD or an EU member country, respectively, and 0
otherwise.
For a summarising list of variables see table A2 in the appendix. Descriptive
statistics for all variables are presented in table A3 in the appendix.
5 Empirical model and estimation results
5.1 Empirical models and methodology
According to our three-step test design set up in section 3 and depicted in figure
1 we start by testing H1 which allows us to draw conclusions about the
relevance of the private interest versus the public interest view on banking
supervision. For this first step, we specify the following model:
                                          
7 For a detailed description of the construction of the private monitoring index see Barth et al.
(2001a: 22).
8 For a description of this database see Demirgüc-Kunt and Sobaci (2000).
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1 2i i i iS SUP C       (1)
where iS  is a variable representing the safety and soundness of the banking
system. iSUP  is a proxy for the supervisory standard. iC  contains control
variables and i  is an error term. According to the public interest view one
would expect higher supervisory standards to contribute positively to the
stability in the banking market.
We then proceed by testing the above specified hypotheses H2 and H3
representing the private interest view. First, we test the barriers to entry
hypothesis. Our empirical model to test H2 takes the following form:
1 2i i i iCOMP SUP C       (2)
where iCOMP  is a variable representing the competition and concentration in the
banking market. iSUP  is the proxy for supervisory stringency and iC  contains
control variables. If the barriers to entry hypothesis holds, higher supervisory
standards should reduce competition and increase concentration in the banking
market.
The final step is the testing of the preference for laxity hypothesis. Here, we
have to keep in mind that this aspect of the private interest view should be more
important than barriers to entry if the testing of H2 does not support a link
between supervision and competition. To test H3 empirically, we employ the
following model:
1 2 3 4i i i i i iSUP B I S C           (3)
where iSUP  is the proxy for the supervisory standards. iB  contains proxies for
the size and the strength of the banking industry and their ability to organise
and, hence, succeed with their interests in the political decision process. iI  is an
interindustry rivalry variable that is a variable representing the insurance
industry. iS  represents variables that control for the safety and soundness of the
banking system. Finally, iC  contains other control variables. According to the
preference for laxity hypothesis one would expect the strength of the banking
industry to influence supervisory stringency negatively. As mentioned above,
the sign associated with the interindustry variable is ambiguous, depending on
the incentives of the insurance industry to influence supervisory regulation. 
We estimate several specifications of equations (1), (2) and (3) by selecting
different combinations of the respective proxy variables. We use ordinary least
squares regression and logit regression analysis and take the White and
Huber/White heteroskedasticity consistent covariance estimates, respectively.
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Looking at the specified empirical models clearly reveals a problem of causality.
To cope with this endogeneity problem as well as with potential measurement
errors we use instrumental variable procedures in addition to OLS regressions.
The empirical results are reported in tables 1-6 – for the IV regressions in
appendix B – and discussed in the next sections.
5.2 Public interest view – testing H1
Before coming to the private interest view hypotheses, i.e. the barriers to entry
and the preference for laxity hypothesis, we try to find out whether supervision
offers leeway for regulation in the industry’s interest. This is likely to be the
case if there is no clear link between the stability of the banking sector and the
supervisory system’s characteristics. 
We have several specifications for testing H1. In a first set, we use the variable
CRISIS as a proxy for the safety and soundness of the banking system (table
1). In a second set, we use the number of banks closed in the last 5 years
(CLOSED) relative to the total number of banks (BANKS) as a measure of
banking system stability (table 2). Unfortunately, CLOSED/BANKS may assess
the stability of the banking system incorrectly since a high relative number of
closed banks may indicate an anticipatory and highly successful supervision.
Nevertheless, we run some regressions using this measure in addition to the
regressions with the CRISIS variable. We use the variable BUDGET/ASSETS
and EXAM as the proxy for the supervisory standard, respectively.9
We include GDPCAPITA as a control variable since one may rather expect a
banking crisis in a poorer country.10 In addition, we include in some
specifications either DI or MONITOR as other control variables. Deposit
insurance (DI) may encourage excessive risk taking (moral hazard) and hence
influence the stability of the banking system as a whole (Demirguc-Kunt and
Detragiache, 2000, Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002, Barth et al., 2002a). With
more private oversight, i.e. a higher private monitoring index (MONITOR) one
would expect an increase in the stability of the banking system. Furthermore, by
including CB and MULTIPLE, respectively, we test whether the supervisory
                                          
9 We also ran regressions using POWER and SUPERVISORS as proxies for the supervisory
stringency. The results do not differ substantially and are thus not reported.
10 We also included GDPGROWTH as a control variable. High GDP growth should result in
higher bank profits which in turn should contribute to the stability in the banking sector.
However, GDPGROWTH had no significant impact on CRISIS and CLOSED/BANKS,
respectively.
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structure has any impact on the stability of the banking system.11 The results are
reported in tables 1 and 2 (the IV regression results in table B1).12
- insert table 1 about here -
The CRISIS specifications (table 1) are estimated using a logit model where
coefficients are based on Huber/White robust standard errors. According to the
public interest theory we would expect a higher supervisory standard to reduce
the probability of a systemic banking crisis. In almost none of the logit
regressions where we used CRISIS as the dependent variable do we find a
significant impact of supervisory standard on the likelihood of a systemic
banking crisis.13 This result is in line with the findings by Barth et al. (2002a).14
In the regressions where we used BUDGET/ASSETS as a proxy for supervisory
stringency we do not find a significant impact of the supervisory structure (CB
and MULTIPLE) on banking system stability. However, CB has a significant
negative influence on the likelihood of a crisis in some regressions where we
included EXAM as a proxy for supervisory stringency. If the central bank is
involved in supervision a crisis is less likely. This may reflect the ability of the
central bank to act as a lender of last resort.
The deposit insurance dummy (DI) also has a significant impact on the
likelihood of a crisis. The evidence here is in line with the moral hazard
argumentation, i.e. generous deposit insurance schemes create moral hazard
which in turn increases the threat of a systemic banking crisis.15 We find no
significant impact of private monitoring (MONITOR) on the stability of the
banking system.
                                          
11 For a more profound study on the relationship between the structure of banking supervision
and regulation, and the resulting safety and soundness of a country’s banking system see
Barth et al. (2001b). Basically our results on that issue are in line with theirs.
12 The number of observations differs from regression to regression since not all variables are
available for all countries. We estimated all regressions in the paper also with a balanced
data set, i.e. included only those countries for which data for all variables was available.
Since the results are not different, they are not reported.
13 Only in specification (10) EXAM, the number of onsite examinations per bank in the last
five years, has a significant negative impact on CRISIS (at the 10% significance level).
14 One explanation for this result may be that countries have learned from banking crisis and
increased supervisory stringency in the aftermath of the crisis. This may be particular
relevant in the light of our data set since the CRISIS dummy refers to the time period late
1970s to 1999 whereas most of our proxies for supervisory stringency refer to the year
1999.
15 This finding is in line with Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2000), Demirguc-Kunt and
Kane (2002) and Barth et al. (2002a).
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GDP per capita (GDPCAPITA) has in most regressions a significant negative
impact. In poorer countries the likelihood of a crisis is higher than in more
developed countries.16
- insert table 2 about here -
The results in table 2 where we used CLOSED/BANKS as the proxy for the
safety and soundness of the banking system show a significant positive impact
of BUDGET/ASSETS on CLOSED/BANKS. Higher supervisory standards result
in more bank closures by supervisors. This finding confirms our presumption
that CLOSED/BANKS does not necessarily measure banking system instability
but may also indicate that supervisors are anticipatory and highly successful by
shutting down problematic banks that when failing may have systemic effects. 
When using EXAM as a proxy for supervisory stringency we do not find a
significant impact on CLOSED/BANKS.17
To sum up, we do not find support for a link between stability in the banking
system and the supervisory stringency. If, however, systems of different
stringency are compatible with stability there is much scope for regulation
targeted at fulfilling private interests. Note that we do not infer that the public
interest is irrelevant. All we conclude is the following: Given the restriction that
the supervisory systems have to guarantee the stability of the banking system
there remain enough degrees of freedom to tailor the details according to the
interests of the regulated industry. We can now concentrate on distinguishing
between the two private interest view hypotheses barriers to entry and
preference for laxity.
5.3 Barriers to entry – testing H2
We have several specifications to test whether the barriers to entry hypothesis is
relevant (equation (2)). First, we include CONC1, the percent of total assets
accounted for by the three largest banks as the left-hand side variable.18 Second,
                                          
16 Using the OECD or the EU dummy instead of GDPCAPITA confirms this result. OECD
and EU members are less likely to experience a systemic banking crisis.
17 Neither do we find any significant link when using SUPERVISORS or POWER as a proxy
for supervisory stringency. The results of the instrumental variable estimations also show
no significant link between supervisory standards and CLOSED/BANKS.
18 One problem may arise with the computation of the concentration measure, since e.g. in the
U.S. concentration at the national level is relatively low (the three largest banks account for
about 21 percent of total assets) whereas there may be almost a monopoly position for
some banks at the regional level. Including a U.S. dummy in the regressions shows that
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we use the interest rate margin (DRATES) which is a measure for the
competition in the banking market. Third, by taking FOREIGN1, the percent of
banks that are foreign owned, as the dependent variable we test whether
supervisory regulation may be captured to prevent foreign banks from entering
the banking system, hence to reduce competition from abroad. As a proxy for
the strength of supervision we use total budget for supervision divided by bank
assets (BUDGET/ASSETS) and EXAM, the number of onsite examinations per
institution in the past five years.19 In addition, we include in some regressions
ASSETS/GDP to control for the size of the banking market. The results are
presented in table 3.
- insert table 3 about here -
There is a significant impact of ASSETS/GDP on DRATES (at the 10%
significance level). Higher supervisory standards increase the interest rate
margin banks earn, i.e. reduce competition. In one specification where we used
EXAM as the proxy for supervisory stringency, we find a significant negative
impact on FOREIGN1, i.e. tougher supervision is associated with a lower
percentage of banks that are foreign owned. These findings support the barriers
to entry hypothesis.
However, in all other specifications we do not find a significant impact of
BUDGET/ASSETS on the concentration in the banking market and the presence
of foreign banks.20.
We find ASSETS/GDP to be highly significant. The larger the banking market
the lower concentration and the smaller interest margins, i.e. a relative large
banking market is associated with higher competition. Presence of foreign banks
increases with banking market size.
                                                                                                                                   
this dummy is significant and effects CONC negatively. However, since banking
supervisory standards are set national-wide this problem does not arise in our context.
19 We used also POWER, the official supervisory power index, and SUPERVISORS, the
number of bank supervisors per institution, as proxies for the supervisory stringency. The
results do not differ substantially and are thus not reported.
20 In addition to the OLS regressions, we estimate instrumental (IV) variable regressions as a
robustness check concerning potential simultaneity bias and measurement errors. We use
CLAIMSGDP as the instrument since it is highly correlated with BUDGET/ASSETS but
contemporaneously uncorrelated with the error. The empirical findings from the IV
regressions are reported in the appendix (table B2). They hardly differ from the OLS
results, i.e. we find no significant impact of supervisory stringency on the concentration in
the banking market and the presence of foreign banks. Only in one regression we find a
weakly significant impact on DRATES.
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Summing up, we find to some extent support for the barriers to entry hypothesis.
However, this support holds not for many specifications. Following our testing
procedure summarised in figure 1, we proceed to test the preference for laxity
hypothesis (H3) according to which one would expect banks to press for lax
regulatory standards.
5.4 Preference for laxity – testing H3
We have several specifications to test the preference for laxity hypothesis
according to equation (3). In a first set we use BUDGET, total budget for
supervision in Mill. USD, as the proxy for the supervisory standards.
CLAIMSGDP is used as a proxy for the strength of the banking industry and
CONC1 and CONC2, respectively, for their ability to organise their interests. As
proxies for the strength of the rivalry insurance industry we include the dummy
INSUR indicating whether banks are allowed to undertake insurance activities
plus either insurance penetration (INSPEN) or density (INSDEN). We also
interact INSUR with INSPEN or INSDEN to model the influence of insurance
companies. We use GDP as a macroeconomic control variable. In addition we
control for the stability in the banking market by using the dummy variable
CRISIS and CLOSED/BANKS, respectively. The results for this first set of
regressions are reported in table 4.21 First, we run a regression where we include
CLAIMSGDP, CONC1, INSUR, INSPEN, CRISIS and GDP as the right
hand side variables. We then drop single regressors that have no significant
impact, successively.
- insert table 4 about here -
In all regressions CLAIMSGDP is negatively connected with BUDGET at the 5%
significance level. This result clearly supports the preference for laxity
hypothesis: The stronger the banking industry the lower is supervisory
stringency. Banks press for lax and low-cost supervisory standards. No influence
has, however, concentration in the banking market which we included as a proxy
for the ability to organise their interests.22
In the regressions where we included the variables INSUR and INSPEN, only
the dummy INSUR has a significant impact. In countries where banks are
allowed to undertake insurance activities total budget for supervision is higher,
i.e. supervisory standards. This finding supports the view that insurance
                                          
21 The results of the regressions where we included CONC2 instead of CONC1 and INSDEN
instead of INSPEN are not reported since they do not differ substantially.
22 The same result emerges when one uses CONC2 instead of CONC1.
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companies press for higher supervisory standards in order to weaken their
competitors. This result is confirmed when including the interaction term
INSUR*INSPEN as the interindustry rivalry variable since the associated
coefficient has a positive sign and is significant at the 5% level.
Both variables included to control for the safety and soundness of the banking
system, CRISIS and CLOSED/BANKS, have no significant impact on
BUDGET. This gives to some extent evidence that laxer supervision comes not at
the costs of increasing banking market fragility. However, in this context a
problem of endogeneity emerges which will be discussed below. GDP as a
control variable for the overall size of the economy is highly significant with the
expected positive sign.
Clearly, the high adjusted R-squared in the first set of regressions is due to the
strong influence of GDP on BUDGET. To see whether the results still hold if we
drop GDP as a control variable we run a second set of regressions. In this set we
use total supervisory budget relative to the size of the banking market as a
measure for supervisory stringency, i.e. we take BUDGET/ASSETS,
BUDGET/DEPOSITS and BUDGET/LOANS, respectively, as the dependant
variable. Again CLAIMSGDP, CONC1, CONC2, INSUR, INSPEN, INSDEN
CRISIS and CLOSED/BANKS are taken as independent variables. The results
for the regressions including BUDGET/ASSETS are shown in table 5.23
- insert table 5 about here -
The results do not differ much from the results obtained in the first set of
regressions: In particular, we still find a significant negative relationship
between CLAIMSGDP and BUDGET/ASSETS supporting the preference for
laxity hypothesis. The main difference to the results of the first set of regressions
is that with BUDGET/ASSETS the rivalry industry variables have no significant
impact. Again, the banking system stability variables have no significant impact.
Protecting government banks
So far we have analysed the private interest theory from the industry’s
perspective. There may also be an intrinsic interest of the government if it has
own stakes in the market. One should expect legislators to be the more willing to
follow the industry’s interests, the more stakes a government has in the market.
Thus, managers of public banks should be particularly influential in shaping the
supervisory system according to the industry’s wishes. To test for this
                                          
23 The results of the regressions using BUDGET/DEPOSITS and BUDGET/LOANS as the left
hand side variables, respectively, do not differ substantially and are thus not reported.
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presumption we include GOVERN1 and GOVERN2, that is the percent of banks
and bank assets, respectively, that are government owned. The results are
reported in table 6.
- insert table 6 about here -
Using BUDGET as the left hand side variable we do not find a significant impact
of GOVERN1 or GOVERN2. The results for the other variables do not change:
CLAIMSGDP as well as INSUR and INSUR*INSPEN, respectively, do have a
significant impact supporting the preference for laxity hypothesis.
Taking BUDGET/ASSETS as the proxy for supervisory stringency gives
somewhat different results.24 GOVERN1 has now a significant impact on
BUDGET. However, the positive sign indicates that the more stakes the
government has in the market the higher are supervisory standards which
contradicts the preference for laxity hypothesis. This result does not hold when
using the variable GOVERN2. Nevertheless, the impact of the banking industry
on supervisory standards is still negative and significant, although at a lower
level.
To sum up, we find support for the preference for laxity hypothesis. Banks seem
to exert influence on the stringency of supervision in the sense that they press
for lax and low-cost supervisory standards. This result seems to be reasonable
when taking into account that in most countries supervisory authorities are at
least partly funded by charges to the regulated industry. Some results give
evidence that also the rivalry insurance industry has a significant influence on
the supervisory standards. By pressing for tougher banking supervisory
stringency insurance companies try to harm competitors.
Robustness of the results
So far we used total budget for supervision or budget relative to the size of the
banking market as proxies for supervisory stringency. Table 7 presents
regression results when using EXAM, the number of onsite examinations per
bank in the last 5 years as the dependent variable. We find in some
specifications a significant negative impact of the strength of the banking
industry on supervisory stringency, supporting the preference for laxity
hypothesis. Furthermore, we find in some regressions a significant impact of the
rivalry insurance industry in the sense that they press for tougher banking
supervision in order to harm competitors.
                                          
24 Using BUDGET/DEPOSITS and BUDGET/LOANS instead of BUDGET/ASSETS gives
basically the same results. These regressions are thus not reported.
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However, when using the number of professional supervisors per institution
(SUPERVISORS) and official supervisory power (POWER) as the dependent
variable, respectively, we do not find a significant impact of the strength of the
banking industry nor of the rivalry insurance industry.25
Concerning potential simultaneity bias and measurement errors we estimate
instrumental variable (IV) regressions as a robustness check in addition to the
OLS regressions. The empirical findings from the IV regressions are partially
reported in appendix B (tables B3 and B4).26 They hardly differ from the OLS
findings.
In both regressions, with BUDGET and with BUDGET/ASSETS as the
dependant variable, we find a significant negative impact of CLAIMSGDP. In
two of the regressions with BUDGET as the dependent variables we find a
significant impact of the concentration in the banking market (at the 10%
significance level). Higher concentration, i.e. better ability to organise is
associated with laxer supervisory stringency which is in line with Becker (1983).
However, we do not find a significant impact of the rivalry industry variables in
any regression.
Furthermore, we estimated regressions using a balanced sample of countries, i.e.
we included only those countries for which data for every variable was available
irrespective of whether this particular variable was actually included in the
regression. The results of these regressions do not differ from the results of the
regressions where the respective largest sample of countries was used for every
single regression. These results are thus not reported but can be obtained upon
request.
6 Summary and conclusions
This study tests for the relevance of Stigler’s capture view on regulation in the
context of banking supervision. According to Stigler regulation is driven by the
interest of the regulated industries. Based on a cross-section data set we test
several hypotheses deduced from this private interest theory. Beforehand we
assess the relevance of the public interest view that accounts for welfare
enhancing regulation. The empirical results lend support to the relevance of the
private interest view: The difference of supervisory systems in terms of
stringency indicators has no significant impact on the likelihood of a systemic
                                          
25 These regression results are not reported but can be obtained upon request.
26 We do not report IV results corresponding to table 6 and 7. They do not differ substantially
from the OLS results.
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banking crisis. This leaves per se a larger scope for the private interest view
following Stigler’s capture theory.
In this context we differentiate between the barriers to entry and the preference
for laxity hypothesis. According to the barriers to entry hypothesis one would
expect banks to press for higher supervisory standards in order to reduce
competition. In contrast, the preference for laxity hypothesis states that banks
are interested in lax and low-cost supervisory standards since they regard
supervision as a cost burden. Our empirical results concerning the barriers to
entry hypothesis are not clear cut. We find some evidence that tougher
supervision is associated with higher bank margins, i.e. lower competition.
However, higher supervisory standards do not significantly effect concentration
in the banking market.
This finding allows to concentrate on the preference for laxity hypothesis which
is clearly supported: The regulated banking industry exerts influence on
supervisory standards in the sense that they press for lower supervisory
stringency. This laxer supervision does, however, not come at the cost of higher
fragility in the banking market. This is important for the normative conclusion:
We do not find that the banking industry’s influence on supervision is
destabilising.
Finally, there is a clear message for the ongoing reform process in European
banking supervision. Everybody who wants to forecast the outcome of this
process has to identify the industry’s interests. These interests can be expected
to have a major impact for the future system. 
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Figures and tables
Figure 1 – The three-step testing design
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Table 1 – Testing the relevance of the private interest view (H1, dependent variable CRISIS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
BUDGET/
ASSETS
226.2526
(0.7402)
115.5582
(0.8627)
299.2640
(0.6571)
-176.2492
(0.7955)
239.9885
(0.7262)
-219.1771
(0.7355)
EXAM -0.069806
(0.3002)
-0.078256
(0.2885)
-0.129974
(0.1172)
-0.141975*
(0.0937)
DI 1.827320**
(0.0275)
1.747996**
(0.0329)
1.551400***
(0.0079)
1.651785**
(0.0137)
MONITOR 0.250335
(0.9349)
CB -1.484122
(0.1257)
-1.373043
(0.1382)
-1.702299**
(0.0171)
-1.909693**
(0.0420)
MULTIPLE 0.264357
(0.7445)
GDPCAPITA -6.62E-05*
(0.0859)
-0.000101**
(0.0321)
-5.77E-05
(0.1630)
-9.99E-06*
(0.0523)
-6.74E-05*
(0.0959)
-0.000129**
(0.0161)
-8.58E-05**
(0.0465)
-0.000115**
(0.0200)
-0.00012***
(0.0033)
-0.00016***
(0.0045)
Constant 0.778839
(0.1636)
0.091577
(0.8917)
0.489893
(0.8010)
2.045046*
(0.0796)
0.740585
(0.1958)
1.258721
(0.2977)
1.038343**
(0.0234)
0.447692
(0.3778)
2.915769***
(0.0009)
2.516460**
(0.0163)
McFadden
R-squared
0.121121 0.209155 0.090846 0.177193 0.1222605 0.252840 0.110118 0.187269 0.152248 0.231515
N 35 35 33 35 35 35 66 66 66 66
Note: Logit regressions, P-values in parentheses; coefficients are based on Huber/White robust standard errors; ***, **, * indicates 1, 5, 10% significance level.
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Table 2 – Testing the relevance of the private interest view (H1, dependent variable CLOSED/BANKS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
BUDGET/
ASSETS
102.1918**
(0.0209)
96.26033**
(0.0263)
100.8317**
(0.0276)
108.3588**
(0.0404)
111.5538**
(0.0133)
105.0518**
(0.0406)
EXAM 0.004434
(0.5591)
0.002641
(0.6935)
0.005450
(0.5260)
0.003692
(0.6380)
DI 0.051576
(0.3060)
0.052749
(0.3071)
0.098337
(0.1765)
0.099283
(0.1810)
MONITOR 0.001813
(0.8910)
CB 0.018653
(0.6598)
0.027607
(0.5474)
0.028540
(0.6289)
0.031005
(0.6326)
MULTIPLE 0.084306
(0.3048)
GDPCAPITA -1.09E-06
(0.5520)
-2.10E-06
(0.3564)
-1.13E-06
(0.6286)
-7.09E-07
(0.6964)
-1.25E-06
(0.5309)
-1.57E-06
(0.4777)
-4.56E-06**
(0.0307)
-6.50E-06**
(0.0230)
-3.91E-06*
(0.0661)
-5.82E-06**
(0.0233)
Constant 0.068389*
(0.0476)
0.053333*
(0.0654)
0.059011
(0.6004)
0.051592
(0.1805)
0.054060*
(0.0820)
0.028696
(0.4475)
0.149209***
(0.0003)
0.127092***
(0.006)
0.118325*
(0.0742)
0.093288
(0.2881)
Adjusted R-
squared
0.144459 0.150511 0.104878 0.122272 0.174866 0.130431 0.008966 0.024558 -0.002758 0.012113
N 37 35 35 37 37 35 80 75 80 75
Note: P-values in parentheses; using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from OLS regression; ***, **, * indicates 1, 5, 10% significance level.
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Table 3 – Testing “barriers to entry” (H2)
CONC1 DRATES FOREIGN1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
BUDGET/
ASSETS
6314.850
(0.2554)
-2751.420
(0.5305)
5444.376**
(0.0233)
4256.048*
(0.0923)
4821.832
(0.5657)
-4197.664
(0.4544)
EXAM -0.098147
(0.9072)
0.393505
(0.3670)
-1.348556*
(0.0741)
ASSETS/GDP -1.372384***
(0.0000)
-1.526169***
(0.0000)
-1.697712*
(0.0589)
-2.854957***
(0.0027)
2.092148***
(0.0000)
2.118108***
(0.0000)
Constant 51.26983***
(0.0000)
54.16240***
(0.0000)
60.47675***
(0.0000)
6.034815***
(0.0001)
8.598640***
(0.0020)
8.978519***
(0.0000)
43.92110***
(0.0000)
38.35308***
(0.0000)
41.99184***
(0.0000)
Adj. R-squared 0.006696 0.032146 0.040497 0.073284 0.068663 0.074925 -0.013838 0.074492 0.084696
N 43 39 62 37 35 53 44 39 62
Note: P-values in parentheses; using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from OLS regression; ***, **, * indicates 1, 5, 10% significance level.
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Table 4 – Testing “preference for laxity” (H3, dependant variable BUDGET)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CLAIMSGDP -55.58529**
(0.0218)
-56.18351**
(0.0158)
-54.93925**
(0.0173)
-54.32665**
(0.0137)
-40.59715**
(0.0193)
-64.77470**
(0.0250)
-70.26736**
(0.0219)
-65.29533**
(0.0161)
-62.06044**
(0.0213)
-62.09727**
(0.0134)
CONC1 0.050819
(0.8313)
0.015308
(0.9475)
-0.024432
(0.9055)
-0.104405
(0.6745)
-0.040387
(0.8433)
INSUR 33.64866**
(0.0164)
31.20449**
(0.0179)
26.62701**
(0.0182)
25.30852**
(0.0163)
21.90290**
(0.0113)
INSPEN -12.52122
(0.9566)
20.01542
(0.9232)
24.46130
(0.9074)
49.34437
(0.7829)
INSUR*INSPEN 368.1552**
(0.0303)
327.1414*
(0.0650)
351.9390**
(0.0476)
329.4164**
(0.0300)
322.0898**
(0.0406)
CRISIS 2.279620
(0.8753)
-0.017789
(0.9990)
4.089653
(0.7495)
2.430466
(0.8357)
CLOSED/BANKS -34.13141
(0.4693)
GDP 4.24E-05***
(0.0000)
4.17E-05***
(0.0000)
4.09E-05***
(0.0000)
4.06E-05***
(0.0000)
4.03E-05***
(0.0000)
4.03E-05***
(0.0000)
3.99E-05***
(0.0000)
4.00E-05***
(0.0000)
4.00E-05***
(0.0000)
3.99E-05***
(0.0000)
Constant 4.422598
(0.8070)
7.450915
(0.5345)
12.53331
(0.4582)
11.44378
(0.1580)
8.360059*
(0.0603)
23.82833
(0.2469)
37.54308
(0.1204)
27.43273
(0.1065)
24.12829
(0.1204)
25.44907**
(0.0285)
Adj. R-squared 0.812212 0.815351 0.815490 0.818604 0.820223 0.804016 0.809532 0.810948 0.812742 0.818384
N 33 34 36 37 50 33 32 34 36 37
Note: P-values in parentheses; using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from OLS regression; ***, **, * indicates 1, 5, 10% significance level.
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Table 5 – Testing “preference for laxity” (H3, dependant variable BUDGET/ASSETS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CLAIMSGDP -0.000714**
(0.0486)
-0.000615**
(0.0420)
-0.000701*
(0.0504)
-0.000668**
(0.0407)
-0.000644**
(0.0439)
-0.000677**
(0.0132)
-0.000772**
(0.0335)
-0.000725**
(0.0382)
-0.000735**
(0.0278)
-0.000677**
(0.0328)
CONC1 -2.37E-06
(0.4636)
-2.11E-07
(0.9504)
-2.92E-06
(0.3865)
-2.14E-06
(0.4825)
-2.70E-06
(0.4010)
INSUR 5.76E-05
(0.7962)
-7.19E-06
(0.9673)
7.60E-05
(0.6779)
4.10E-05
(0.8543)
5.84E-05
(0.7501)
0.000140
(0.3712)
INSPEN -0.001462
(0.3522)
-0.001207
(0.3516)
-0.000665
(0.5806)
-0.001707
(0.3093)
-0.000923
(0.4502)
INSUR*INSPEN -0.000997
(0.5028)
-0.000292
(0.7693)
-0.001260
(0.4472)
-0.000606
(0.5800)
CRISIS -4.23E-05
(0.8350)
-3.76E-05
(0.8532)
-5.67E-05
(0.7596)
-5.37E-05
(0.7711)
CLOSED/BANKS 0.001072
(0.3907)
Constant 0.000789
(0.1010)
0.000545
(0.2263)
0.000715*
(0.0627)
0.000677*
(0.0827)
0.000574**
(0.0297)
0.000514***
(0.0100)
0.000823
(0.0501)
0.000750**
(0.0442)
0.000713**
(0.0195)
0.000610**
(0.0148)
Adj. R-squared 0.081981 0.149408 0.096909 0.106520 0.112922 0.135004 0.110239 0.120924 0.134523 0.137640
N 32 32 34 32 34 40 32 34 32 34
Note: P-values in parentheses; using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from OLS regression; ***, **, * indicates 1, 5, 10% significance level.
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Table 6 – Testing “preference for laxity” (H3, extension: “protecting government banks”)
Dependent variable BUDGET Dependent variable BUDGET/ASSETS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CLAIMSGDP -59.68040**
(0.0223)
-56.60987**
(0.0132)
-67.69058**
(0.0309)
-65.74760**
(0.0155)
-63.30485**
(0.0205)
-0.000693*
(0.0639)
-0.000639*
(0.0652)
-0.000669*
(0.0762)
-0.000611*
(0.0772)
-0.000800**
(0.0322)
CONC1 0.002646
(0.9920)
-0.057552
(0.8048)
0.070878
(0.7740)
-3.48E-06
(0.2324)
-2.83E-06
(0.2175)
-2.83E-06
(0.3968)
INSUR 34.95293**
(0.0232)
30.18867**
(0.0216)
0.000231
(0.1911)
0.000172
(0.2233)
INSPEN -11.11021
(0.9661)
9.576579
(0.9629)
0.001214
(0.4587)
0.000720
(0.5898)
INSUR*INSPEN 348.3426*
(0.0704)
332.8777*
(0.0554)
405.9676**
(0.0291)
0.001017
(0.3756)
0.000664
(0.5265)
-0.001299
(0.4115)
CRISIS -0.344499
(0.9847)
1.142771
(0.9447)
-2.175154
(0.8713)
8.19E-05
(0.5093)
4.88E-05
(0.5996)
2.09E-05
(0.9170)
GOVERN1 0.034354
(0.8808)
0.026035
(0.8148)
-0.037420
(0.8628)
-0.040534
(0.7352)
1.19E-05***
(0.0012)
1.13E-05***
(0.0031)
1.02E-05***
(0.0050)
1.03E-05***
(0.0050)
GOVERN2 0.569746
(0.3523)
-6.03E-06
(0.1609)
GDP 4.22E-05***
(0.0000)
4.14E-05***
(0.0000)
3.99E-05***
(0.0000)
3.99E-05***
(0.0000)
4.12E-05***
(0.0000)
Constant 9.890983
(0.7231)
10.93444
(0.2545)
30.42452
(0.3182)
27.75177**
(0.0407)
12.19873
(0.4830)
0.000390
(0.1791)
0.000307
(0.1425)
0.000572*
(0.0997)
0.000434
(0.1144)
0.000924*
(0.0508)
Adj. R-squared 0.807994 0.817139 0.796181 0.812454 0.808931 0.200798 0.237365 0.197430 0.240427 0.102298
N 32 34 32 34 33 31 33 31 33 32
Note: P-values in parentheses; using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from OLS regression; ***, **, * indicates 1, 5, 10% significance level.
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Table 7 – Testing “preference for laxity” (H3, dependant variable EXAM)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CLAIMSGDP -4.250476
(0.1427)
-3.517918
(0.1183)
-4.127274**
(0.0478)
-3.578320**
(0.0356)
-4.234280*
(0.0946)
-3.675193*
(0.0643)
-4.307221**
(0.0376)
-3.738014**
(0.0220)
CONC1 0.029865
(0.3689)
0.031771
(0.3142)
0.023430
(0.5079)
0.025507
(0.4498)
INSUR 2.458987**
(0.0403)
2.166584**
(0.0445)
2.013954**
(0.0301)
1.857874**
(0.0381)
INSPEN -10.82039
(0.5820)
-7.093543
(0.6767)
-7.281009
(0.6767)
-0.814940
(0.9537)
INSUR*INSPEN 4.907134
(0.7858)
9.354781
(0.5911)
7.398699
(0.6418)
13.74072
(0.3765)
CRISIS -1.215895
(0.4203)
-1.377719
(0.2916)
-1.043478
(0.4850)
-1.257663
(0.3340)
CLOSED/BANKS
Constant 3.968391
(0.1703)
2.882975
(0.1593)
5.465732***
(0.0018)
4.261368***
(0.0000)
5.270703
(0.1238)
4.186018*
(0.0811)
6.277543***
(0.0020)
5.107991***
(0.0000)
Adj. R-squared 0.097716 0.073847 0.106151 0.079904 0.014526 0.018358 0.048383 0.040426
N 44 46 52 55 44 46 52 55
Note: P-values in parentheses; using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from OLS regression; ***, **, * indicates 1, 5, 10% significance
level.
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Appendix A
Table A1 – Countries included
EU countries OECD countries Others
Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, United Kingdom
Australia, Canada, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Hungary,
Iceland, Japan, Korea, Mexico,
New Zealand, Poland,
Switzerland, Turkey, United
States
Argentina, Aruba, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan,
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,
British Virgin Islands, Burundi,
Cambodia, Chile, China,
Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, Estonia,
Gambia, Ghana, Gibraltar,
Guatemala, Guernsey, Guyana,
Honduras, India, Indonesia,
Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya,
Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon,
Lesotho, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Macao, Macedonia,
Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives,
Malta, Mauritius, Moldavia,
Morocco, Namibia, Nepal,
Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Peru,
Philippines, Puerto Rico, Qatar,
Romania, Russia, Rwanda, El
Salvador, Samoa (Western),
Saudi Arabia, Seychelles,
Singapore, Slovenia, Solomon
Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka,
St. Kitts, Taiwan, Tajikistan,
Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad &
Tobago, Vanuatu, Venezuela,
Vietnam, Zambia
Note: Table displays all countries that are included in at least one regression. Cayman Islands and Turks and
Caicos Islands are the only two countries from the World Bank sample that do not appear in any regression due
to lack of data. All EU countries are also OECD member countries.
Table A2 – Variables, definitions and sources
Variable Definition Source
BUDGET Total budget for supervision (Mill. USD in
1999)
World Bank survey
EXAM Number of onsite examinations per bank in
last 5 years
World Bank survey
SUPERVISORS Number of professional bank supervisors per
institution (1999)
World Bank survey
POWER Official Supervisory Power (index ranging
from 0 to 16, with a higher value indicating
more power)
Barth et al. (2001a)
CLAIMSGDP Bank claims on private sector to GDP (1990-
99 average)
IMF International Financial
Statistics (line 22d)
ASSETS Total bank assets (Mill. USD in 1999) OCC survey
DEPOSITS Total bank deposits (Mill. USD in 1999) OCC survey
LOANS Total bank loans (Mill. USD in 1999) OCC survey
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Table A3 – Variables, definitions and sources – continued
BANKS Number of banks (1999) Calculated from number of
banks per 100,000 people (taken
from Barth et al., 2002b) and
POP
DRATES Lending minus deposit rate (1999) IMF International Financial
Statistics (lines 60l and 60p)
CONC1 Percent of total assets accounted for by 3
largest banks (1999)
OCC survey
CONC2 Percent of total deposits accounted for by 3
largest banks (1999)
OCC survey
INSUR Insurance activity of banks ("unrestricted +
permitted"=1;  "restricted + prohibited"=0)
World Bank survey
INSPEN Insurance penetration: premiums as share of
GDP total business (1990-99 average)
Swiss Re sigma database
INSDEN Insurance density: premiums per capita (in
USD) total business (1990-99 average)
Swiss Re sigma database
GOVERN1 Percent of banks that are government owned
(1999)
OCC survey
GOVERN2 Percent of bank assets that are government
owned (1999)
OCC survey
FOREIGN1 Percent of banks that are foreign owned
(1999)
OCC survey
FOREIGN2 Percent of total bank assets that are foreign
owned (1999)
OCC survey
CLOSED Number of banks closed in the last 5 years World Bank survey
CRISIS Crisis dummy (1: systemic banking crisis
since the late 1970s; "borderline crisis” is not
taken as a crisis with the exception of Italy
and the US)
Caprio and Klingebiel (1999),
complemented by information
from Demirgüc and Detragiache
(2000) and Barth et al. (2001c)
GDP Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in current
USD (Mill. USD in 1999)
World Development Indicators
database (World Bank)
GDPCAPITA GDP per capita in constant 1995 USD (1990-
99 average)
World Development Indicators
database (World Bank)
GDPGROWTH GDP growth (annual %; 1990-99 average) World Development Indicators
database (World Bank)
POP Population (million in 1999) IMF, World Bank
MULTIPLE Multiple bank supervisory authorities
predominate (1:yes, 0:no; 1999)
Barth et al. (2002b)
CB Central bank is one of the supervisors (1:yes,
0:no; 1999)
Barth et al. (2002b)
MONITOR Private monitoring index (index ranging from
0 to 7, with higher values indicating more
private oversight)
Barth et al. (2001a)
DI Deposit insurance (1:explicit, 0:implicit) World Bank deposit insurance
database
OECD EU dummy (1:EU member country)
EU OECD dummy (1:OECD member country)
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Table A3 – Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Observations
BUDGET 17.81862 2.005515 400 0.006964 55.97261 59
EXAM 3.519885 3 21 0 3.118676 87
SUPERVISORS 2.633511 1.5 18 0 3.034541 94
POWER 11.00952 12 16 0 2.962896 105
CLAIMSGDP 0.435698 0.3325 1.6848 0 0.331616 91
ASSETS 472554.6 18953.9 7213630 90.7 1327440 82
DEPOSITS 307066.8 12633.95 5783937 20.9 978268.7 82
LOANS 285413.5 9422.1 4730738 11 891680.5 82
BANKS 1008.738 26 87958 1 8531.151 107
DRATES 7.458547 5.25 54.42 -4.75 7.452376 86
CONC1 57.83866 57.79 100 16.2 22.26739 82
CONC2 59.75375 59.4 100 0 22.9914 80
INSUR 0.504673 1 1 0 0.502331 107
INSPEN 0.038444 0.0293 0.13048 0.004256 0.030906 70
INSDEN 598.5228 128.7119 3927.336 1.020727 868.4813 70
GOVERN1 9.788506 5 94.12 0 14.12811 87
GOVERN2 20.53414 10 81.00667 0 22.68526 103
FOREIGN1 41.7131 39.935 100 0 29.68677 84
FOREIGN2 33.2509 20 100 0 33.23179 101
CLOSED 16.16667 1 1172 0 116.0332 102
CRISIS 0.535714 1 1 0 0.501718 84
GDP 302901.7 29246.89 9237000 153.2491 1077722 96
GDPCAPITA 8567.569 3367.215 44485 147.821 11034.4 96
GDPGROWTH 2.995408 3.085 11.53 -9.62 3.078307 98
POP 45.98896 7.13 1266.8 0.0168 157.5979 107
MULTIPLE 0.158879 0 1 0 0.367283 107
CB 0.728972 1 1 0 0.446582 107
MONITOR 6.811881 7 11 3 1.572977 101
DI 0.526316 1 1 0 0.501956 95
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Appendix B: Instrumental variable regressions
Obviously, looking at the specified empirical models (1), (2) and (3) reveals a
problem of causality. This simultaneous equation bias implicates that the
correlation between the respective exogenous and the disturbance term i  is
nonzero. As a consequence the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is biased
and inconsistent. To cope with this endogeneity problem as well as with
potential measurement errors we use instrumental variable (IV) procedures in
addition to the OLS regressions. Tables B1 to B4 present the results of the two
stage least squares (TSLS) regressions. The instruments used are given in the
notes to the tables, respectively.
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Table B1 – Testing the relevance of the private interest view (H1) – IV regression results
dependent variable CRISIS dependent variable CLOSED/BANKS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
BUDGET/ASSETS 1504.981
(0.4787)
-98.86767
(0.9686)
1204.535
(0.5824)
-142.2212
(0.9593)
105.5670
(0.4455)
45.41753
(0.7569)
114.4284
(0.5136)
47.13840
(0.7934)
DI 1.846585**
(0.0385)
1.761523**
(0.0479)
0.057822
(0.2598)
0.058002
(0.2648)
CB -1.386551*
(0.0999)
-1.311376
(0.1214)
0.022916
(0.8123)
0.004785
(0.9609)
GDPCAPITA -5.47E-05
(0.1541)
-0.000104**
(0.0385)
-8.40E-05*
(0.0595)
-0.000127**
(0.0102)
-1.03E-06
(0.5009)
-2.84E-06
(0.1841)
-5.45E-07
(0.8542)
-2.75E-06
(0.4138)
Constant 0.295457
(0.7339)
0.172034
(0.8621)
1.432402
(0.2046)
1.170736
(0.3467)
0.067276
(0.1538)
0.072863
(0.1576)
0.046289
(0.7125)
0.068517
(0.6028)
McFadden/adjusted
R-squared
0.129256 0.208776 0.181909 0.251748 0.141356 0.112256 0.118719 0.085578
N 35 35 35 35 36 35 36 35
Note: P-values in parentheses; using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from TSLS regression; ***, **, * indicates 1, 5, 10% significance level.
CLAIMSGDP used as an instrument.
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Table B2 – Testing “barriers to entry”(H2) – IV regression results
CONC1 DRATES FOREIGN1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BUDGET/
ASSETS
31879.30
(0.1812)
20085.75
(0.3769)
13429.15*
(0.0643)
18739.27
(0.1631)
-37166.92
(0.1611)
-21253.68
(0.3864)
ASSETS/GDP -1.013753***
(0.0000)
1.700989
(0.4828)
1.773902***
(0.0000)
Constant 42.30616***
(0.0000)
46.95760***
(0.0000)
3.640800***
(0.0000)
0.315617
(0.9490)
51.93579***
(0.0000)
42.41886***
(0.0000)
Adj. R-squared -0.544171 -0.235323 -0.145801 -0.546352 -0.328285 -0.022833
N 40 38 37 35 40 38
Note: P-values in parentheses; using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from two stage least squares (TSLS)
regression; ***, **, * indicates 1, 5, 10% significance level; CLAIMSGDP used as an instrument.
Table B3 – Testing “preference for laxity” (H3, dependant variable BUDGET) – IV regression
results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CLAIMSGDP -82.33348**
(0.0239)
-84.77666**
(0.0323)
-53.74375**
(0.0123)
-84.05798**
(0.0259)
-62.72458**
(0.0119)
-81.11137**
(0.0467)
CONC1 -0.803617*
(0.0860)
-1.418581*
(0.0787)
-0.848776
(0.1118)
-1.475193*
(0.0852)
INSUR 25.11446
(0.3302)
31.80974
(0.1919)
27.46108**
(0.0304)
INSPEN 86.83722
(0.7676)
324.6893
(0.2833)
42.61031
(0.8459)
INSUR*INSPEN 179.9525
(0.5407)
318.5379
(0.1439)
454.9029
(0.1170)
CRISIS -34.10297
(0.2543)
4.558150
(0.8516)
-41.52799
(0.1426)
0.286184
(0.9907)
GDP 3.66E-05***
(0.0000)
3.45E-05***
(0.0001)
4.10E-05***
(0.0000)
3.49E-05***
(0.0000)
3.99E-05***
(0.0000)
3.50E-05***
(0.0000)
Constant 82.13572**
(0.0477)
78.75113*
(0.0796)
7.924770
(0.7482)
106.2960**
(0.0215)
26.06551
(0.2545)
102.1078**
(0.0476)
Adj. R-squared 0.701545 0.655461 0.814485 (0.667965) 0.812536 0.642640
N 32 33 36 32 36 33
Note: P-values in parentheses; using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from two stage least squares (TSLS)
regression; ***, **, * indicates 1, 5, 10% significance level; ASSETS/GDP and GDPCAPITA used as instruments for
CONC1 and CRISIS, respectively.
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Table B4 – Testing “preference for laxity” (H3, dependant variable BUDGET/ASSETS) –IV
regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CLAIMSGDP -0.000716*
(0.0680)
-0.000721*
(0.0607)
-0.000662*
(0.0621)
-0.000830**
(0.0462)
-0.000795**
(0.0406)
-0.000696**
(0.0434)
CONC1 -2.00E-06
(0.6354)
-3.89E-06
(0.4539)
-5.22E-06
(0.3130)
-6.11E-06
(0.2331)
INSUR 4.94E-05
(0.7921)
5.83E-05
(0.7547)
4.47E-05
(0.8100)
INSPEN -0.001610
(0.1881)
-0.000772
(0.5951)
-0.001634
(0.1836)
INSUR*INSPEN -0.000711
(0.6895)
-4.96E-05
(0.9695)
-0.000702
(0.6007)
CRISIS -7.35E-05
(0.7392)
-1.65E-05
(0.9511)
-8.07E-05
(0.7150)
6.65E-05
(0.7938)
GDP
Constant 0.000802*
(0.0966)
0.000795*
(0.0870)
0.000656*
(0.0772)
0.000998**
(0.0490)
0.000945**
(0.0455)
0.000609*
(0.0752)
Adj. R-squared 0.080813 0.095948 0.106134 0.093907 0.104081 0.122882
N 32 33 32 32 33 32
Note: P-values in parentheses; using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from two stage least squares (TSLS)
regression; ***, **, * indicates 1, 5, 10% significance level; ASSETS/GDP and GDPCAPITA used as instruments for
CONC1 and CRISIS, respectively.
